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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the determinants of the demand for pharmaceuticals in the 
Spanish Autonomous Community of Catalonia using the latest available official survey data. 
Having accounted for the individual differences in cost-sharing among consumers, as well as 
the influence of self-medication, the paper builds a model of the (household) determinants of 
pharmaceutical expenditure and consumption. The econometric application deals with the 
infrequency of purchases and the non-distinction between out-of-pocket spending and drug 
cost sharing. The empirical evidence suggests that income and the variables accounting for 
cost sharing were significantly associated with drug use but not drug expenditure. 
Furthermore, gender, health status and having health insurance appear to be significant 
predictors. Access to pharmacies increases both drug use and expenditure; self-medication 
also increases drug expenditure as expected. These results are relevant for the entire Spanish 
case where current reform proposals have recommended the introduction of means-tested 
income-related rather than age related co-payments. The same applies to the need for 
controlling self-medication which results from individual behaviour of consuming medicines 
for minor ailments without a prescription and which can be acquired OTC and are priced 
cheaply.  
 
Keywords: pharmaceutical expenditure, demand for pharmaceuticals, cost containment, user 
charges and cost-sharing, household budget surveys, Catalonia, Spain.  
 
JEL classifications: I11, I18
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1. Introduction 
Pharmaceutical spending is the most dynamic component of health care expenditure 
in most European Union (EU) countries (Mossialos and Le Grand, 1999). However, research 
on the determinants of pharmaceutical expenditure is still limited. Studies indicate that, in 
addition to price regulation, pharmaceutical expenditure is sensitive to cost sharing 
(Newhouse et al, 1993).  The understanding of the causes of pharmaceutical expenditure 
requires an examination of the process leading to the demand for medicines. Conceptually, 
the demand for prescription drugs results from the physician-patient agency relationship. The 
physician takes into account the patient’s utility and, arguably, the costs of prescribing to the 
health insurer as well as the patient in the presence of cost sharing arrangements (Hellerstein, 
1994, Dranove, 1989).  Patient insurance is argued to affect doctor’s prescribing decision as 
well as patient consumption (Pavcnik, 2000). Indeed, the physician may be acting as a perfect 
agent for the patient; he might not be a perfect agent for the (public or private) insurer 
(Feldstein, 1976).  
One of the most frequently used tools to control utilisation of health care resources, 
and, indirectly, health care expenditure, is cost-sharing, whereby the patient bears part of or 
the entire cost of health care use.  Cost sharing has been found to reduce health expenditure 
with limited effects on health (Manning et al, 1993; Newhouse et al, 1993). Additional 
research indicates that high cost-sharing rates increase compliance with medications (Dor, 
2004). Further evidence suggests that most of the effects of cost sharing are determined by 
the numbers of prescriptions filled (Leibowitz et al,1986). Indeed, the rationale for 
introducing co-payments for pharmaceuticals relates to the pursuit of controlling potential 
physician/consumer moral hazard in prescribing/consuming drugs without bearing the costs 
for the health system  (Cossley et al, 2000).  Even though rising costs may justify insurance 
coverage to reduce the burden of out-of-pocket drug spending (Stuart et al, 2000) significant 
moral hazard effects may induce individual drug consumption to rise.  Nonetheless to reduce 
moral hazard, cost sharing is employed by most of European health systems either in the form 
of a fixed fee (Germany (until end-2003), Ireland and the United Kingdom) or co-insurance, 
whence the insuree pays a proportion of the price (Spain, Greece, France), or a deductible, 
where the insuree pays a fixed amount out-of-pocket before health insurance coverage kicks 
in (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland), or, most often, a combination of the above.  Yet, 
the effectiveness of co-payments in containing expenditure and improving system efficiency 
is disputed (Tamblyn et al, 2001). In Spain, effective cost sharing in pharmaceuticals has 
declined progressively between 1986-2000 while real pharmaceutical expenditure has 
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increased significantly as Table 1 shows. There is also some evidence arguing that elderly 
patients are using their exemption rights under the Spanish NHS to fill prescriptions on behalf 
of their relatives in order not to pay the statutory co-payment (Costa-Font and Puig, 2004; 
López-Bastida and Mossialos, 2000). This feature points to the need of examining the 
determinants of drug consumption and expenditure to assess which predictors have an impact 
on household consumption, and whether co-payment determinants, such as age and disability 
significantly influence expenditure. Furthermore, in examining the association between 
income and expenditure on the one hand and demand for drugs on the other, one might 
determine whether the current co-payment structure might determine access to drugs and 
expenditure patterns. Co-payment structures not linked to income could lead to inequality in 
accessing medicines. Evidence suggests that subsidising prescription drugs to elderly in 
Canada turns out to be less beneficial compared with what would have been if the same 
amounts had been put into a programme of fixed cash transfers paid equally to all households 
(Alan et al, 2002).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Previous studies on the demand for health care in Spain from household budget 
surveys have tended to exclude the demand for pharmaceuticals, mainly because the 
existence of statutory patient co-payments limits the likelihood of identifying its  influence 
with accuracy (López , 1998). Only one study estimated the effects of co-payments using 
aggregate data and found a low-price elasticity (Puig, 1988). Evidence from the US suggests 
that insurance coverage for pharmaceuticals increases the use of and expenditure on 
prescription drugs, and may lead to a reduction of out-of pocket expenditures (Lillard et al 
1999; Coulson et al, 1995). However, there is still little evidence of this phenomenon in 
European countries including Spain.  
In this context, the objectives of the paper are twofold: first, to estimate the impact of 
the variables influencing cost sharing and the individual demand for pharmaceuticals. 
Second, to analyse whether demographic, socio-economic and health status characteristics 
influence the out-of-pocket demand and expenditure for pharmaceuticals along with the 
influence of self-medication.  Therefore, the dependent variables are (a) individually adjusted 
household pharmaceutical expenditure and (b) whether household respondents have 
consumed drugs in the last month. Thus, this study deals with the determinants of the access 
to pharmaceuticals and out-of-pocket expenditure along with other potential determinants 
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such as demographics, the impact of self-medication, socio-economic and health status 
variables, and the presence or not of chronic conditions among respondents. We employ a 
two-equation model to estimate the determinants of pharmaceutical expenditure due to the 
censoring nature of the data. In explaining drug use we also employ a sample selection model 
(Heckman, 1978) to capture the potential influence of physician gate-keeping in accessing 
prescription medicines. From the variables included in the model we are in a position to 
investigate the influence of cost sharing policies, self-medication and income effects on the 
demand for pharmaceuticals.   
Section two provides a description of the market for medicines in Spain as well as the 
regulatory features of the Spanish pharmaceutical market. Section three develops the 
theoretical model and the expected determinants. Section four analyses the empirical 
specification and section five discusses the results. Finally, section six draws the main 
conclusions.  
 
2. The Spanish Pharmaceutical Market and Regulation  
 
The Spanish National Health System (NHS) is tax-funded and provides universal and 
free health care coverage, with some exceptions such as non-refundable co-payments for 
prescribed pharmaceuticals. The general rate of co-payment for drugs has remained at 40% 
since the early 1980s. However, prescription medicines for pensioners and medicines 
consumed in hospitals are provided free of charge, and chronically ill patients under 65 (for 
example, diabetics) only pay 10% of their prescription drug costs, with a price cap of €2.64 
per prescription item. Private health care outlays account for 20% of total health care outlays 
in Spain. Approximately 15% of the population has supplementary private health insurance, 
which does not cover prescription drugs. In the early 1980s the NHS underwent radical 
reform, with the gradual introduction of a decentralised model involving the creation of 17 
autonomous regional health services, corresponding to the 17 Autonomous Communities 
(ACs) into which Spain is divided. These regional bodies have political responsibility for 
health care, although, with the exception of Navarre and the Basque Country, they remain 
financially dependent on the central government. 
The market for pharmaceuticals in Spain comprises three main segments: (i) over-the-
counter (OTC) medicines for which consumers pay the entire cost out-of-pocket (which may 
include vitamins and other supplements), (ii) prescription medicines (patented novel 
medicines, branded and unbranded generics) sold under NHS GP prescription which are 
subjected to co-payments depending on patient characteristics and (iii) medicines purchased 
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through a private prescription, where the consumer bears the entire cost out-of-pocket.  
Prescription drugs account for approximately 92% of total pharmaceutical expenditure and 
85.5% of the total market by volume, with OTCs accounting for the remainder (Costa-Font 
and Puig-Junoy, 2004). Although the Spanish NHS provides comprehensive drug coverage, 
patients purchase a significant proportion of all drugs consumed as OTC. OTCs are mainly 
analgesics (19% of total OTC expenditure), cough and cold preparations (17%), respiratory 
system drugs (16%), dermatological drugs (11.9%), and laxatives, vitamins and supplements 
(6%). The prescription market dominates pharmacists’ sales. On average, prescription drugs 
are three times more expensive than OTCs1. In the 1990s, there was some debate on the 
hypothetical effects of cost-containment policies (such as introducing a negative list and 
implementing additional barriers to obtaining prescriptions for less expensive drugs) on the 
development of the OTC market, since OTCs can be advertised directly to the consumers 
whereas prescription drugs cannot. However, the volume of OTCs has remained stable over 
time; though expenditure increased by 7.5% between 1990 and 2001, the market for 
prescription drugs increased significantly in terms of both number of packs (1.5% increase 
annually) and sales growth (10.7% increase)2. In an environment where direct-to-consumer 
(DTC) advertising is banned for prescription drugs, promotional campaigns that are indirectly 
linked with prescription-only medicines focus on GPs only, whereas they do focus on the 
general public through TV advertising in the OTC market. 
Pharmaceutical regulation comprises measures on the supply-, proxy demand- and 
demand-side. Supply-side policies comprise intervention on the prices of medicines, whereas 
proxy demand-side policies deal with the prescribing and dispensing of medicines. Finally, 
demand-side policies target patients, through cost sharing. The central government in Madrid 
is responsible for setting prices of medicines and determining the overall cost sharing and 
reimbursement strategy at national level the latter with the participation of representatives 
from the 17 autonomous communities, whereas the regions, including Catalonia, are 
responsible for implementing national policy and paying providers within their jurisdiction. 
Experiments with proxy demand policies, for instance on prescribing, have been observed at 
regional level. Controlling pharmaceutical expenditure is one of the main policy priorities of 
the Spanish NHS. Pharmaceutical expenditure accounts for 1.2% of GDP and has risen 
systematically since the establishment of the NHS in 1986.  In the 1990s, expenditure growth 
has been driven by volume increases rather than pharmaceutical price inflation (Costa-Font 
 
1 Average (per pack) prices were €6.07 for prescription drugs and €2.05 for OTCs in 2001. 
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and Puig, 2004).  Decentralisation of the Spanish NHS has meant that each of the 17 
autonomous regions has had significant flexibility in organising and delivering health 
services. Catalonia was the first autonomous region to have obtained responsibility for health 
care organisation and delivery in 1981. Regional health services are only partially responsible 
for pharmaceutical care, especially in promoting generic pharmaceuticals and prescribing 
policies, whereas the central government, through the Ministry of Health (MoH) and other 
interdepartmental commissions and agencies, undertakes drug registration and licensing and 
sets drug prices. Pharmaceutical expenditure accounts for roughly 20% of total public health 
care expenditure in Spain, making this share one of the highest in the EU.  
 
2.2 Supply-side policies and pricing of pharmaceuticals 
 
Price regulation of pharmaceuticals is mainly based on the decision of a Commission 
at the Spanish Ministry of Health and Consumption (MoHC) that determines the maximum 
reimbursable price for every pharmaceutical speciality. This price includes generics but 
excludes OTCs. Drug prices differ depending on the setting in which they are sold. For 
instance, drugs sold to hospitals, attract discounts to payers that are explicitly contemplated in 
the maximum price setting that the MoHC undertakes.  Drugs consumed on an outpatient 
basis include wholesale and retail margins on top of the ex-manufacturer price.  
A special Commission on rational drug use determines reimbursement policy where 
the 17 autonomous regions as well as the pharmaceutical industry, consumers, trade unions, 
professional associations and experts designated by the Ministry of Health are present. The 
objective of this Commission is to consider drugs for inclusion into the reimbursement 
(positive) list. The general criteria for inclusion are: a) the characteristics of the disease, b) 
the inclusion of inpatient groups, c) the drug’s therapeutic benefit, d) public expenditure 
limitations, and e) the existence of therapeutic alternatives.  OTCs are excluded from 
reimbursement, unless prescribed by a physician. 68% of prescribed drugs are subject to co-
payments.   
With the passing of the General Health Act in 1986, GPs became integrated into the 
public network. The act improved the general public’s access to primary care. However, it 
has also led to an increase in the number of GP visits, a development likely to have had some 
influence on the number of prescriptions. As GPs are paid on a fixed salary basis, they have 
few incentives to prescribe efficiently, and it was not until the 1990s that some contracts with 
 
2 It is has also been estimated that  the 6% of prescription drugs are dispensed without a prescription. 
Page 7 of 25
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
8
providers that took into account prescribing expenditure. Financial incentives were 
introduced in Navarre (1998) and in Catalonia (1999) to encourage primary care physicians 
to prescribe drugs “cost-effectively” and increase their prescribing of generics; GPs were also 
subjected to stricter control over both efficiency and quality. Furthermore, primary care 
pharmacists were established in 1995 to monitor prescribing patterns and to offer advice to 
consumers on suitable pharmaceutical treatments.3
Prescribing policies are based on practice guidelines developed at the regional level. 
Physicians –both GPs and specialists- are paid a salary partly determined by incentives linked 
to prescribing quality. Generics are being extensively promoted through a reference price 
system albeit penetration is less that 6% of total market volume. Proxy demand-side policies 
implemented in Spain mainly refer to the introduction of stricter prescribing controls, 
although there is still evidence of significant clinical variability, the introduction of de-listing 
policies in the form of “negative lists" for drugs for minor ailments, and the establishment of 
fixed budgets for pharmaceutical spending. Despite the proliferation of policies on the proxy-
demand, the robustness with which they have been implemented and their effectiveness in 
containing pharmaceutical costs have been disputed in the literature (Lopez and Mossialos, 
2000).  
Although the statutory nominal co-payment rate for pharmaceuticals has been 40% 
for most drugs since the early 1980s, the effective co-payment rate (i.e. the rate taking into 
account exemptions and log-term illnesses) has declined from 15% in 1985 to 7% in 2002, 
and this was deemed responsible for an increase by 0.4% annually in the share of 
pharmaceuticals in total public health care expenditure during that period (Costa-Font and 
Puig, 2004). As a result, cost sharing levels in Spain are among the lowest in the EU. 
Simultaneously, the share of pharmaceutical spending of the retired population (who amount 
to around 15% of the total population and are exempt from co-payments) practically doubled 
(from 39% to 72%) between 1985 and 2002. As Table 1 shows, the share of retired 
consumers increased significantly from around 60% at the end of the 1980s to 72% in 2002. 
This partially reflects an increase in the number of retirees, who have significantly higher 
consumption patterns than non-retirees. Whilst expenditure per active individual was below 
€60 in 2000, expenditure per pensioner in 2003 amounted to €140 (Costa-Font and Puig-
Junoy, 2004).  
 
3 The information system to be developed in the near future for a national prescription monitoring system – 
through the so-called Independent Prescription Identification Terminal – might be used to identify and warn 
physicians who are judged to be overprescribing. 
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3. Theoretical Background and Empirical Application 
 
3.1 The model 
 
Standard economic theory suggests that the demand for pharmaceuticals derives from 
the individual demand for health care following the Grossman tradition (Grossman, 1972). 
Agents employ time and health care inputs -both intangible (medical care) and tangible 
(pharmaceuticals)  - to fulfil demand for health.  Let us follow state-dependent demand 
analysis and assume that each household/individual i maximises a utility function subject to a 
budget constraint. As a result an indirect utility function can be isolated that will depend on 
the health status of the individual whether sick or not. If sick, the individual will consume a 
certain drug (k) depending on the percentage of individual income (y) it absorbs (which 
would be reduced or eliminated by means of existing co-payments), prices (p) of drugs and 
substitute treatments, and other characteristics (z). However, when the individual is healthy, 
the value of drugs is null and thus utility can be reduced to individual income as follows: 
 



=
healthy if)(
sick if),,(
iik
ikiik
hi xv
zpxv
v (1) 
 
where iy is the total expenditure per household that is assumed to be equal to disposable 
income, kp refers to prices and iz is a vector of household characteristics. Under the Roy’s 
identity, following Alan et al (2002), a percentage increase in prices under the assumption of 
sickness leads to: 
 
i
k
ik
k
ik
y
v
q
p
v


=


(2) 
 
where ikq is the quantity consumed of drug k by the household i, so that a rise in prices will 
reduce welfare proportionally to the income reduction from facing the drug prices times the 
quantity of drugs consumed. Accordingly, the demand for drugs will be constrained by the 
following explanatory variables: health status ( ih ) as determining need and sickness, income 
( iy ) which influences the capacity to cope with larger cost-sharing and prices of drugs, and 
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the prices for pharmaceuticals  (and thus the individual –specific cost-sharing characteristics) 
( ikp ) which can be approximated by the influence of proxy variables such as  ‘age’ and 
‘disability’ although part of the effects might be associated with health deterioration. Finally, 
our model includes a number of specific variables affecting the consumption of medical and 
pharmaceutical products ( iz ). Those variables include education attainment, (Kenkel, 1991), 
and self-medication, the latter determining the extent to which an individual might pay for 
medicines out-of-pocket.  Therefore, we can model the demand for drugs )( ikq as dependent 
on those variables as follows: 
 
),,,( iiikiik zyphqq = (3) 
 
where the expected marginal effects would be  0,0,0 








i
ik
ik
ik
i
ik
y
q
p
q
h
q
while the effect of 
specific determinants might exhibit different signs. 
 
3.2 Household determinants of pharmaceutical expenditure 
 
Given (3), demand analysis under price heterogeneity4 leads to examining out-of-
pocket pharmaceutical expenditure ( )* ikikik xqpQ = measured in logs, the set of determinants 
(such as cost-sharing characteristics [p], changes in income [y], health status [h], as well as 
other specific characteristics [z]) and the error term ( µ ). Furthermore, given the co-payment 
structure we just observe the out-of-pocket expenditure rather than total expenditure. 
Therefore, we proceed by formulating a two-stage model that takes into account the censored 
nature of the data as follows:  
 
0
0Qif0
**
*
*
>=
=
+=
QifQQ
Q
XQ i µ
(4) 
 
4 Drugs are products subject to substantial product and price differentiation; therefore it is impossible to estimate 
adequate household specific price index.   
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This specification allows accounting for a number of zero responses appearing due to 
the existence of the cost sharing policies (not paying the co-payment versus paying the co-
payment) and X refers to all explanatory variables. In a first stage we examine the 
determinants of some drug consumption using a probit model )/0( XQpr > and in a second 
stage we examine )/0/( XQQE > . If Q measures household out-of-pocket expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals, the coefficient in logs is interpreted as elasticities5. Because information on 
the controlling variable (health status) is at the individual level we have excluded this 
variable from the expenditure function, which will serve, jointly with self-medication, as an 
identification variable. Furthermore, because drugs are not consumed on a day-to-day basis, 
one might expect to find a censoring problem. Therefore, we employed a two-part model 
where in a first stage we examine the determinants of any pharmaceutical expenditure and in 
a second stage we examine the determinants of pharmaceutical expenditure given that the 
household has undertaken some expenditure. Finally, to test for the potential existence of 
sample selection we employed the Heckman correction (Heckman, 1979). 
 
3.3 The determinants of the pharmaceutical consumption 
A further question that arises refers to the determinants of access to drugs.  Because 
the access to drugs might depend on previous referral from a GP, we model and estimate a 
joint process involving the choice of consuming a particular drug and whether or not this 
arose from a visit to a GP in order to obtain a prescription for it.. Let D* denote the demand 
for drugs, let V* be the benefits from visiting the physician and let W and K be vectors of 
explanatory variables for the valuation and participation equations respectively which contain 
the same explanatory variables as in (3). Then we can write: 
 
iWD  += '
* (5) 
and 
 iKV  += '
* (6) 
 
We cannot observe both D* and V*, but we can observe D and V taking a value of 1 
if there is respectively some drug consumption and whether there is a visit to a GP. 
Therefore, from (5) and (6) we can write the bivariate normal distribution as BivN ዊ�
5 Examining elasticities is important because I might be informative on the effects of subsidies on drugs. Indeed, 
subsidising more those commodities whose consumption tends to fall with income. Thus, income elasticity 
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( ),,  ii xz  with zero means, variances equal to 1 and  denoting the correlation matrix of 
the error terms of the two processes underlined in (5) and (6).  
 
4. Data and variables 
4.1 The data 
 
In order to estimate the determinants of the demand for pharmaceuticals, we used data 
from the 1994 Catalan Health Survey, which is the latest available. This is a general health 
survey that contains detailed data on pharmaceutical expenditure and use and is 
representative of the Catalan population All policies mentioned above regarding pricing, 
reimbursement, and other cost containment measures for pharmaceuticals within Spain, also 
apply to the case of Catalonia. The survey also contains information on medical utilisation 
and expenditure and has 15,000 observations in individual and household format. Although 
the survey does not contain explicitly the co-payment rate for pharmaceuticals, this 
information has been approximated by two main variables: age  (if the individuals is over 65, 
then the co-payment is zero) and disability (co-payment is reduced to a 10% if individual is 
disabled).  In all other cases, the co-payment should be 40% per prescription item. The mean 
individual age is approximately 40 and about 3% of the population has some disability, which 
entitles them to a low co-payment rate. Furthermore, the survey contains information on the 
individual’s family income and education, which provide an indication of the role of socio-
economic position as influencing the demand for drugs. Household size can reveal 
preferences about lifestyle as well as potential household-specific disease patterns.  For 
identification purposes, we include whether the individual ‘smokes’ or not to control for 
potential individual-specific health care need. The same applies to private health insurance 
entitlement (PHI) which might be an important determinant of access to private health care 
(Vera, 1999) and accordingly to the consumption of drugs on an out-of-pocket basis, since 
PHI does not cover drugs. The survey allows identifying individual self-medication through a 
set of questions on whether the household has purchased drugs without obtaining a physician 
prescription that points out the presence of self-medication. Finally, we have included other 
relevant characteristics such as the pharmacy density and doctor’s density in the specific sub-
regions in Catalonia, which is informative on potential access effects on pharmaceutical 
consumption.  
 
provides come information on whether or not to subsidize certain goods.  
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4.2 The variables 
Table 2 contains the description of the variables employed in the study. We separate 
the dependent variables (out-of-pocket expenditure [Q], drug use [D] and GP visits [V]) from 
the explanatory variables (household size, gender, age, disability, education, smoking, private 
health insurance, self-medication, doctor density in region and pharmacy density in region). 
Out-of-pocket expenditure refers to the declared household pharmaceutical expenditure in the 
last 30 days and drug use refers to the consumption of drugs in the last 30 days. Health status 
is measured by a self-reported assessment of health  (where 4 refers to excellent health and 1 
refers to bad health). We have also included household size for two reasons. First, out-of-
pocket pharmaceutical expenditure might reduce total household expenditure. Second, the 
larger the number of family members the more likely it is that drug consumption may be the 
result of intra-household health effects of specific illnesses (especially for minor conditions). 
Female gender is commonly associated with higher consumption of health care goods and 
services and male gender is more closely associated with smoking than female gender. 
Education influences health related information which, in given the assumptions of Grossman 
(1972) is envisaged as increasing the productivity of health production. Disability and age are 
variables, which are linked to specific cost sharing structures. In our model we have included 
age squared in order to distinguish between the specific effect of age in general, and that of 
an advanced age where the individual is likely to be entitled to free prescribed medicines. 
Income and private health insurance are variables associated with the individual’s capacity to 
bear the costs of out-of –pocket pharmaceutical expenditure as well as the likelihood of 
obtaining private prescriptions, which might lead to out-of pocket consumption. Finally, 
pharmacy density and doctors’ density are variables, which are associated with access to 
drugs.  
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
5. Results  
 
The results of the econometric approach followed are summarised in Table 3 and are 
grouped under Model (1) and Model (2). All models were estimated using conventional OLS 
when estimating expenditure and using probit analysis when the data was dichotomous. 
Model (1), reports the results of the two-part model for the determinants of out-of-pocket 
pharmaceutical expenditure [Q] and pharmaceutical use [D]. Model (2) contains a Heckman 
selection model examining the determinants of drug use [D] accounting for the likely effects 
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of visiting a physician (GP) and obtaining a prescription [V].  Before proceeding with 
running the models, we first tested for selectivity in each of them.  We found no evidence of 
selectivity in Model (1) using the conventional Mills Lambda whereas there is selectivity in 
Model (2) as the  is significantly different from zero and has a positive coefficient (Table 
3). The latter indicates that a joint estimation, as employed in this case, is necessary and that a 
one-equation estimation would produce biased estimates. Furthermore, the difference in the 
coefficients of drug use [D] would result from heterogeneity since drug use can be the 
outcome of GP prescribing behaviour.  This is a unique feature of pharmaceutical 
consumption, at least in what concerns prescription medicines, and is very often the 
consequence of a prior decision to visit a doctor from which a prescription isissued. 
Conventional specification tests are reported and indicate acceptable explanatory power and a 
joint significance for the estimated models.  
With regards to the results of Model (2), examining those variables that account for 
the effect of cost sharing we find that although age determines drug use [D] disability does 
not (Table 2, model (2) – left panel. Thus, having a 0% co-payment rate for the retired elderly 
increases significantly the demand for pharmaceuticals as expected. By contrast, in Model 
(1), expenditure [Q] is determined by disability rather than age (Table 3, Model (1) – left 
panel). This affects results from the fact that the elderly are excluded from co-payments and 
therefore they undertake very limited out-of-pocket expenditure on pharmaceuticals. In 
addition, elderly patients have an incentive to contact their GPs and receive prescriptions 
which can be filled free of charge, and which might otherwise be considered OTC and 
payable fully out-of-pocket. On the other hand, individuals suffering from some chronic 
disability may incur expenditure both through filling prescriptions as well as paying out-of-
pocket for drugs. When correcting by potential sample selection (Model (2)) for those visiting 
a GP then age is not significant, suggesting that potential barriers in accessing drugs might be 
influenced by a previous visit to a GP.  Gender does exert some effect on drug consumption. 
Males are less likely to use drugs and more likely to consume out-of-pocket than females 
(Model (1)). However, when we turn into the selectivity corrected in Model (2) we find that 
males are less likely to visit the GP and accounting for this feature, are more likely to use 
drugs than females. Again, this result confirms that the potential heterogeneity resulting from 
GP visits might exert significant influence on the results. Other relevant control variables are 
household size and health status, both of which are statistically significant and positively 
associated with drug use and expenditure, and in accordance with the Grossman tradition 
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(Grossman, 1972). Furthermore, smoking is found to be positively associated with higher 
out-of-pocket pharmaceutical expenditure and a higher drug use. However, when drug used is 
corrected by potential visits to the GP we find that smoking was not significant anymore and 
it turns to be determining a reduced access to the GP. 
Possibly one of the most interesting results from the study is the lack of significance 
of income in predicting out-of-pocket expenditure on drugs while helps predict a significant 
effect on drug use even when correcting for the estimated parameter by the potential sample 
selection.  This result is in line with Stuart et al (2000) and suggests a small elasticity of 
demand for drugs.   The fact that income explains drug use but not expenditure might suggest 
that due to the co-payment structure, some individuals might refrain from consuming drugs 
and might instead consume alternative health care free-of-charge. On the other hand, 
pharmaceuticals as an input to the health production process are not demanded unless the 
individual is ill, and thus income plays a small role here once having controlled for health 
status. Education has some effect on out-of-pocket expenditure suggesting a limited, although 
potentially important, role of information in drug expenditure. In addition, education is 
inversely related to the degree of access to the system. This indicates that the lower the 
education attainment the higher is the access to the GP, most likely to obtain valuable health 
information.  
Finally, two interesting findings point to the importance of access to medicines and 
the importance of self-medication. Self-medication is estimated as a control variable for out-
of-pocket health expenditure and displays a positive coefficient as expected.The positive and 
significant effect of pharmacy density even when accounting for potential sample selection 
indicates that there is an access motive in the demand for medicines which influences both 
drug use and out-of pocket expenditures. Finally, those individuals that have private health 
insurance (PHI) are more likely to report some drug use although that does not significantly 
influence out-of-pocket expenditure. This could be because private health insurance in Spain 
provides a faster access to the GP compared with statutory health insurance provided by the 
NHS. On the other hand, PHI might be correlated with some of the unobserved variables 
associated with drug access such as income, risk aversion and health information among 
other determinants.   
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5. Discussion  
 
This paper has sought to analyse the determinants of the demand for pharmaceuticals 
and out-of-pocket expenditures in Catalonia (Spain). Consistently with previous literature, the 
paper has specifically dealt with individual characteristics of the demand for pharmaceuticals 
(Stuart, 2000; Poisal et al, 2000). However, in examining the results, one important 
distinction may be drawn between individual and economic determinants. This distinction is 
important because although individuals may need to consume specific drugs with or without 
a prescription, out-of-pocket expenditures may be associated with specific economic 
determinants  (eg. income or having private health insurance). Indeed, consistently with the 
existing literature, individual characteristics such as ill health and gender appear to be 
important determinants of the demand for drugs. Empirical evidence from the US suggests 
that a large proportion of prescriptions for Medicare beneficiaries is associated with 
individuals reporting several co-morbid illnesses (Stuart et al, 2000). Gender is also a 
relevant determinant and women were shown to spend more out-of-pocket for drugs than 
men. This can be partly explained by the prevalence of conditions primarily affecting women 
after age 55. Age and disability are also important in determining access to drugs and in 
explaining out-of-pocket pharmaceutical expenditure. Our evidence suggests that due to the 
prevailing cost-sharing structure in Spain and Catalonia variables such as age and disability 
might have different effects on pharmaceutical expenditure and use compared with other 
studies. As expected from the prevailing cost sharing structure in Catalonia, age appears to be 
a significant determinant of drug access but not of out-of-pocket expenditure while disability 
is the other way around. The literature also identifies disability at young age as a relevant 
determinant of pharmaceutical expenditure. Poisal et al (2000) find that disabled beneficiaries 
under the age of 65 spend almost twice as much as those over the age of 65. However, the 
relevance of age is not entirely clear in that although age and health status are associated with 
expenditure, personal drug costs for chronically ill patients appear to be lower than for other 
age groups due to cost sharing exemptions (Stuart, 2000).  Brendt et al (1998) show that there 
is no clear evidence of the direction of age-related effects and, if they exist, they really 
depend on the type of drug analysed and whether it treats chronic or age-related conditions or 
not.  Thus, a distinction may be set between medicines that are subsidized by the NHS and 
those that are not. When drugs are not rationed or co-payments are small we may expect 
pharmaceutical expenditure to rise. However, when estimating the effect of cost sharing on 
demand, we should take into account that co-payments are set according to individual 
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characteristics that result from higher need of pharmaceutical consumption due to a fragile 
health status. 
Turning to the economic determinants of drug expenditure and use, private health 
insurance coverage together with income provides some evidence of a higher likelihood of 
drug use among the most affluent consumers, although both variables were not significant 
predictors of out-of pocket expenditures. This results from the fact that OTCs are normally 
low priced drugs whereas the co-payment that less affluent individuals might have to pay for 
drugs is significant. On the other hand, this results from the fact that the cost sharing structure 
in Spain is based on age rather than on income, and the elderly, who do not pay for drugs, 
often is more affluent than households or individuals of younger average age. Finally, both 
income and PHI appear to be strong determinants of drug use, which implies that there might 
be socio –socio-economic barrier to the access for drugs (once controlling for health status). 
The current cost sharing structures  (40% of the cost of medicines if the full rate applies) or 
the cost of obtaining medicines on an out-of-pocket basis may deter consumers from 
accessing drugs in certain circumstances.  
Recent work on the influence of insurance on the demand for prescription drugs finds 
that private insurance coverage leads to increased demand for drugs (Coulson et al, 1995). 
Interestingly, the influence of income remains once correcting for sample selection to account 
for the physician influence on prescribing and dispensing.  Physicians, as agents acting on 
behalf of patients, are key in determining demand for medicines through their clinical 
practice and prescribing behaviour.  The significance of self-medication in increasing 
pharmaceutical out-of-pocket expenditure indicates that a part of the population might not 
consume drugs on the basis of doctor’s prescription but based on their own perceptions and 
available health information. Finally, once controlling for the influence of self-medication we 
find that improved access to pharmacies increases both drug use and out-of-pocket 
expenditure. 
In examining drug use, we find that results change significantly when drug use is 
jointly estimated with the access to GPs, indicating that the model has captured part of the 
unobserved heterogeneity resulting from the potential drug use with without a prescription.  
Furthermore, the decision to demand drugs available only on prescription is taken by the 
physician rather than the patient. In Catalonia GPs act as gatekeepers and all prescriptions 
covered by the NHS originate from them or from specialists (López and Mossialos, 2000).  
Therefore, the decision to consume prescribed pharmaceuticals cannot be separated from the 
decision to consume health care since the latter is in part the expected result of visiting a 
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physician. Evidence from Catalonia (Vera-Hernandez, 1999) suggests that whereas people 
that purchase PHI tend to visit specialists more often, this is not the case with GP visits, 
typically prescribing drugs subsidised by the NHS.  
This paper also shows that income does not influence out-of-pocket expenditure but 
other variables, such as access to pharmacies; self-medication and household size have a 
significant influence over such expenditure. On the other hand though, income does influence 
drug use; this finding indicates that certain cost-sharing structures, which are not associated 
with individual income might have an impact on access to medicines. Whereas higher income 
and education were associated at individual level with a higher demand for pharmaceuticals, 
neither determines out-of-pocket expenditure at family level. As the utility of medicines is 
zero if the individual is not ill, our finding implies that medicines consumed by individuals 
when ill, are independent of income and education, even though more educated and wealthier 
individuals are more likely to demand and consume them.Education may also be a proxy for 
an individual’s ability to act in order to prevent illness rather than underline individual 
demand for a health related input. 
Finally, this paper shows the difficulties that may appear when using general health 
surveys based on individual data in estimating the demand for pharmaceuticals. Our results 
suggest that estimating the demand for pharmaceuticals with survey data is complex for many 
reasons. Available surveys just show the amount of pharmaceutical expenditure that the 
individual (or the family) has undertaken. However, pharmaceutical expenditure includes out-
of-pocket expenditure (for OTC products and, potentially, prescription-only medicines 
available on a private prescription, or, simply, available at the pharmacy without a 
prescription), and co-payments (most notably for publicly covered prescription medicines); 
the indivisibility between the two types of out-of-pocket expenditure limits empirical 
research.  In this study we estimated that 13% of the Catalan population has consumed a drug 
without any prescription, from where a half of them were drugs for illnesses that would 
require a prescription. As a result, more work should be undertaken in improving available 
databases to test hypotheses on the individual demand for pharmaceuticals. This paper is also 
a first attempt to account for a reduced form of an individual demand where the role of co-
payments is determined indirectly. Although the two-part model employed accounts for a 
possible two-stage decision making-process, it is likely that other health related 
characteristics and more complex models would provide us with more accurate results. 
Empirical problems emerge when using health surveys that contain information on health 
expenditure. Unobserved patient heterogeneity may be significant due to the heterogeneity of 
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pharmaceuticals as consumer products. Information on prices for all medicines is not always 
available easily and when it is, it is surrounded by controversy.  Being in a position to know 
with precision cost-sharing policies affecting different segments of the population, has 
enabled this research to instrument  the price effect by using age and disability information.   
Consequently, a censuring problem appears when estimating the demand for pharmaceuticals. 
When examining individual data on pharmaceutical expenditure we may encounter zero 
observations that may be due to different reasons. First, there may be an infrequency problem 
when using data from only one year. Second, healthy individuals do not consume 
pharmaceuticals as its unnecessary for them. Third, as previously noted, elderly individuals 
may be ill and most likely consume pharmaceuticals, but pay nothing for pharmaceutical 
consumption because of their health insurance coverage, therefore, zero expenditure arises. 
Fourth, even though some people should consume pharmaceuticals, it may be the case that 
some may not be able to afford the high co-payments for some drugs (due to the high prices 
for the latter), however this is less likely (corner solution) to happen due to the increased 
possibility of consuming a substitute drug (generic). 
 
6. Conclusions 
Examining the determinants of the demand for pharmaceuticals and of out-of-pocket 
expenditures is key in understanding the potential impact of changes in drug regulation in a 
country. In particular, this paper has found that out-of-pocket expenditure on pharmaceuticals 
in the Spanish Autonomous Region of Catalonia  is sensitive to the effect of the statutory co-
payment, but is also influenced by individual patterns of self-medication and geographical 
access to drugs. On the other hand, drug use is determined by income, private health 
insurance, the statutory co-payment and health status. From a methodological perspective we 
have found that the demand for pharmaceuticals could be affected by previous consultation 
with a general practitioner. 
Our research has several policy implications both for Spain and other jurisdictions. 
First, we confirm that self-medication explains a remarkable share of out-of-pocket 
expenditure. Therefore, the regulation of the market for OTC products should bear in mind 
this feature. Deregulation of pricing and competition in the OTC market, should enable 
consumers to obtain better deals on their medications. Second, the importance of income and 
private health insurance in determining drug use suggests that there might be a socio-
economic vector explaining the access to drugs. Indeed, because co-payments in Spain are 
not associated with individual’s income, but depend on age and disability, there may be 
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inequality in the access to medicines, such that poorer patients who do not meet age and 
disability eligibility criteria, may still be having to pay 40% of the cost of their medicines. To 
date there is still no study examining inequalities in accessing medicines in Spain and 
therefore future research further investigate this issue. However, in light of the evidence 
presented in this paper, it would be sensible to introduce a reform of cost-sharing to include 
means-tested (income-based) co-payments.  Finally, the effect of pharmacy density in 
explaining drug use indicates that the increasing density of pharmacies in Spain might not be 
neutral in influencing the demand for drugs. Therefore, some additional emphasis should be 
placed in controlling pharmacy growth, with stricter criteria for new pharmacies to open.  
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Table 1. Number of prescriptions, expenditure, share of retired consumers and effective 
co-payments in Spain, 1986-2002 
 
Number of 
prescriptions 
(thousands) 
Real expenditure per 
capita (€) 
 
% Retired 
consumers 
Effective co-
payment rate* 
1986 460,866 52.68 56.6 14% 
1987 470,390 58.09 57.8 13% 
1988 491,249 64.59 59.2 13% 
1989 509,875 69.87 60.3 12% 
1990 532,231 74.93 61.5 10% 
1991 541,057 81.77 62.7 10% 
1992 548,646 85.85 64.1 9% 
1993 534,559 90.01 65.4 9% 
1994 520,463 88.57 67.4 9% 
1995 553,788 93.58 68.3 8% 
1996 581,561 99.67 68.9 8% 
1997 593,046 103.83 69.3 8% 
1998 592,330 111.76 70.1 7% 
2002 na Na 72 7% 
Note: * Cost-sharing expenditure divided by total expenditure 
Source: Consejo del Colegio de Farmaceuticos, 2003.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables employed (N=15,000) 
 
Variable Description Mean s.e 
Dependent 
Q
Household expenditure on drugs in the last 30 days 
(logs) 5.511 0.0317 
D Some pharmaceutical consumption in the last 30 days 0.690 0.0038 
V
The patient has visited the general practitioner in the last two 
weeks 0.215 0.0034 
Explanatory  
Nmemfam Household size 3.680 0.0117 
Sexe Male=1 0.476 0.0041 
Age Age in years 39.614 0.1873 
Lincome Log monthly household income 14.327 0.0063 
Incap Chronic illness=1 0.026 0.0013 
Educ1 No education 0.211 0.0033 
Educ2 Primary Education 0.548 0.0041 
Educ3 Secondary education 0.130 0.0027 
Health Perceived health status (4=excellent, 3=good, 2=fair, 1=bad) 2.96 0.078 
Smoke Smoker=1 0.225 0.0034 
Phi Private health insurance 0.189 0.0032 
Self Self-medication =1 0.132 0.0021 
Phar_des 10,000 Inhabitants per pharmacy in each region 0.290 0.0043 
Doctor_dens 10,000 Inhabitants per doctor in each region 0.217 0.0013 
Source: The authors, from the Catalan Health Survey, 1994 
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Table 3. The demand for pharmaceuticals and pharmaceutical expenditure: results 
from the Catalan Health Survey (1994) of a two-part model of pharmaceutical 
expenditure and pharmaceutical use [Model (1)] and a two-part model of 
pharmaceutical use and physician visit [Model (2)] 
 
Model (1) Model (2) 
Pharmaceutical expenditure 
(Q) 
Pharmaceutical use
(D) 
Pharmaceutical use 
(D) 
Physician visit 
(V) Variables 
Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Nmemfam 0.089* (0.039) 0.125* (0.011) 0.082* (0.017) -0.007 (0.011) 
Sex 0.1428* (0.041) -0.094* (0.027) 0.056* (0.041) -0.136* (0.028) 
Incap  0.346* (0.117) 0.011 (0.082) -0.033 (0.096) 0.159* (0.082) 
Age  -1.9x10-4 (4.6x10-4) 0.006* (0.002) -0.006* (0.004) 0.002* (0.001) 
Age2 1.34x10-4 (1.1x10-4) 1.9x104* (3x10-5) 1.9x10–4* (5x10–4) 4.18x10–4 (3.2x10–4)
Lincome 0.031 (0.083) 0.253* (0.024) 0.192* (0.040) -0.014 (0.025) 
 
Educ1 0.027 (0.068) -0.093 (0.059) -0.282 (0.102) 0.333* (0.061) 
Educ2 -0.150* (0.054) -0.072 (0.050) -0.144 (0.093) 0.111* (0.053) 
Educ3 -0.025 (0.061) -9x10-4 (0.059) -0.146 (0.106) 0.109* (0.061) 
Smoke 0.089* (0.045) -0.071* (0.034) 0.034 (0.025) -0.124* (0.036) 
Phi 0.973 (2.357) 0.124* (0.005) 0.135* (0.051) - -
Health - - 0.152* (0.012) 0.137* (0.012) 0.281* (0.013) 
Self 0.033* (0.011) - - - - - - 
Phar_des 0.230* (0.065) 0.627* (0.166) 0.594* (0.168) 0.987 (0.678) 
Doctor_dens -1.39 (1.310) 2.534 (1.683) -2.045 (1.678) 0.40 (0.467) 
Intercept 7.30* (1.580) -3.253* (0.369) -0.870 (0.619) 0.79* (0.345) 
 0.69 0.023 
 -0.583 0.637       
Wald ( )2 1238.5      394.98  
R2 0.25        
Pseudo-R2 0.23      
LRa (All )0= 1199.55      
Log-Likelihood -4567.9      -6530.24
LRa (  =0)  3.89  
• Significant at 5% of lower level.  
• aLikelihood Ratio Test. 
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